| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove()
appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync().
hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via
hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(),
which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when
no userspace handle holds it open.
key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() /
input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with
a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a
key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer
can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the
teardown drains it.
A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first
still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running
during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which
then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same
URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down()
and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference
appleir->input_dev.
Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing
spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then
shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any
in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls.
appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is
set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference
appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down.
The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event()
previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock;
take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally
closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the
keyrepeat branch.
This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID:
appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been
present since the driver was introduced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix use-after-free on remove
KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link()
during rmmod of imx8_isi:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650
Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000d47cb02a by task rmmod/724
Call trace:
__media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650
__media_entity_remove_links+0x78/0x144
__media_device_unregister_entity+0x150/0x280
media_device_unregister_entity+0x48/0x68
v4l2_device_unregister_subdev+0x158/0x300
v4l2_async_unbind_subdev_one+0x22c/0x358
v4l2_async_nf_unbind_all_subdevs+0xfc/0x1c0
v4l2_async_nf_unregister+0x5c/0x14c
mxc_isi_remove+0x124/0x2a0 [imx8_isi]
Allocated by task 249:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x27c/0x690
mxc_isi_crossbar_init+0x22c/0x560 [imx8_isi]
Freed by task 724:
kfree+0x1e4/0x5b0
mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup+0x34/0x80 [imx8_isi]
mxc_isi_remove+0x11c/0x2a0 [imx8_isi]
The problem is that mxc_isi_remove() calls mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup()
before mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup(). The crossbar cleanup frees the media
entity pads, but the subsequent v4l2 cleanup still tries to remove
media links that reference those pads.
Fix this by calling mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup() before
mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() to ensure all media entities are properly
unregistered while the pads are still valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: Fix use-after-free of ucsi on remove
The threaded IRQ handler ccg_irq_handler() calls ucsi_notify_common(),
which on a connector-change event calls ucsi_connector_change() and
schedules connector work. In ucsi_ccg_remove(), ucsi_destroy() frees
uc->ucsi (kfree) before free_irq() is called, so a handler invocation
already in flight may access the freed object after ucsi_destroy().
CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (threaded IRQ)
ucsi_destroy(uc->ucsi) | ccg_irq_handler()
kfree(ucsi) // FREE | ucsi_notify_common(uc->ucsi) // USE
Move free_irq() before ucsi_destroy() in the remove path. It is kept
after ucsi_unregister(): ucsi_unregister() cancels connector work whose
handler issues GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS through ucsi_send_command_common(),
which waits for a completion that is signalled from the IRQ handler, so
the IRQ must stay active until that work has been cancelled.
The probe error path already orders free_irq() before ucsi_destroy().
This bug was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix UAF of struct file_lock in SMB2_LOCK deferred-lock cancellation
When a blocking byte-range lock request is deferred in the
FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED path, ksmbd registers the asynchronous work into
the connection's async_requests list via setup_async_work(). The cancel
callback smb2_remove_blocked_lock() holds a reference to the flock.
If the lock waiter is subsequently woken up but the work state is no
longer KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE (e.g., due to a concurrent cancellation), the
cleanup path calls locks_free_lock(flock) without dequeuing the work from
the async_requests list. Concurrently, smb2_cancel() walks the list
under conn->request_lock and invokes the cancel callback, which then
dereferences the already freed 'flock'. This leads to a slab-use-after-free
inside __wake_up_common.
Fix this by restructuring the cleanup logic after the worker returns
from ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_wait(). Move list_del(&smb_lock->llist) and
release_async_work(work) to the top of the cleanup block. This guarantees
that the async work is completely dequeued and serialized under
conn->request_lock before locks_free_lock(flock) is called, rendering
the flock unreachable for any concurrent smb2_cancel(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file
smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in
the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the
same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback
is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free.
Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory
enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state,
readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents
another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current
request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: pata_sl82c105: fix bridge revision use-after-free
pci_get_slot() returns a referenced PCI device. Commit 44c10138fd4b
("PCI: Change all drivers to use pci_device->revision") replaced a
configuration-space read with direct access to the cached revision field,
but left that access after pci_dev_put(). The bridge may therefore be freed
before its revision is read.
Read the revision before dropping the reference. |
| A malicious IMAP server can trigger use-after-free and heap-memory disclosure by sending a crafted ID response. Heap contents can ultimately be persisted to prefs.js. This vulnerability was fixed in Thunderbird 155, Thunderbird 140.15, and Thunderbird 153.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF of hci_conn_params in add_device_complete
add_device_complete() runs from the hci_cmd_sync_work kworker, which
holds only hci_req_sync_lock and *not* hci_dev_lock. It calls
hci_conn_params_lookup() and then dereferences the returned object
(params->flags) without taking hci_dev_lock:
params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr,
le_addr_type(cp->addr.type));
...
device_flags_changed(NULL, hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr,
cp->addr.type, hdev->conn_flags,
params ? params->flags : 0);
hci_conn_params_lookup() walks hdev->le_conn_params and is documented to
require hdev->lock. A concurrent MGMT_OP_REMOVE_DEVICE
(remove_device()), which does run under hci_dev_lock, can call
hci_conn_params_free() to list_del() and kfree() the very object the
lookup returned, so the subsequent params->flags read touches freed
memory [0].
Hold hci_dev_lock() across the hci_conn_params_lookup() and the read of
params->flags (and the matching event emission) so the lookup result
cannot be freed by a concurrent remove_device() before it is used,
honouring the locking contract of hci_conn_params_lookup().
[0]: (trailing page/memory-state dump trimmed)
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671
Read of size 1 at addr ffff000017ab26c1 by task kworker/u9:8/388
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 388 Comm: kworker/u9:8 Not tainted 7.0.11 #20 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:499 (C)
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0xd4 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x118/0x5d8 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xb0/0xf4 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378
add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x14c/0x240 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334
process_one_work+0x628/0xd38 kernel/workqueue.c:3289
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3372 [inline]
worker_thread+0x7a8/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3453
kthread+0x39c/0x444 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860
Allocated by task 3401:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:570
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1b0/0x458 mm/slub.c:5385
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:950 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
hci_conn_params_add+0x10c/0x4b0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2279
hci_conn_params_set net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5162 [inline]
add_device+0x5b4/0xa54 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7755
hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1721 [inline]
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x10b4/0x1dd0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1841
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x128 net/socket.c:742
sock_write_iter+0x250/0x390 net/socket.c:1195
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x66c/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:688
ksys_write+0x1fc/0x24c fs/read_write.c:740
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:751 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:748 [inline]
__arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa4 fs/read_write.c:748
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x84/0x2a8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x294 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0xac arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:724
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:743
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596
Freed by task 3740:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL
Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on
double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is
KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But
KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same
freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too:
SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets
the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock()
worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s
the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes
the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the
cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on
conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock
pointing at the freed file_lock.
A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the
KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same
use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is
silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger.
Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal
states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees
the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE
so any non-active work is skipped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc
krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and
rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL
completion callback and treat any negative return from
crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to
kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an
async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer
is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the
worker dereferences the freed slab on completion.
KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend
bound to krb5->encrypt_name:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7
The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async
instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing
crypto_wait_req() through every call site.
Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and
net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to
the krb5 enctype name. |
| Use after free in TabStrip in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via UI Interaction. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Use after free in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Browser in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Proxy in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range()
map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via
perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are
serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event.
Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race
rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
===== =====
rb_alloc_aux() map_range()
[1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0]
[2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++
[3]: perf_mmap_to_page()
returns rb->aux_pages[0]
[4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP
[5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1
munmap the page
[6]: free rb->aux_pages[0]
Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a
mapping to a freed physical frame.
Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver
The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget,
but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where
usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work)
while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory
(e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a
NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed:
[39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140
[39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60
...
[39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8
[39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140
[39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134
[39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode
[39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c
[39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664
Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the
gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new
usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added,
usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc
structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is
released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and
then calls the gadget's release routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs
trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with
only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c)
resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and
classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter
via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace().
trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a
different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which
asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from
sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem
helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In
the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an
rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side
lock to keep nodes alive there.
A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore
triggers lockdep on debug kernels:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
7.1.0-... Tainted: G E
-----------------------------
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
1 lock held by net_tests/540:
#0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0},
at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
trie_lookup_elem
bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect
bpf_trampoline_...
security_socket_connect
__sys_connect
do_syscall_64
This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize
against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per
distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM
that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common.
For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation
from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all
three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already
follow this convention.
For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as
rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same
file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no
lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than
lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not
machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare
rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which
holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left
untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: legousbtower: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect
Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be
stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the
completion handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: ldusb: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
