| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: Unmask interrupts only when ACTIVE is true
There is a small race window between intel_rps_boost() reading
a stale ACTIVE state and queuing rps->work, where ACTIVE may be
changed via asynchronous calls triggered by wakeref drop.
This means that rps_work() could be triggered after the GT has
been parked, so unmasking RPS PM interrupts would happen without
holding PM wakelock. This sequence of events may be observed
during live_rc6_ctx_wa() selftest:
1) live_rc6_ctx_wa()
-> intel_engine_pm_put()
-> wakeref_put()
ASYNC1) wakeref_put() callback
-> __engine_park()
-> intel_gt_pm_put_async()
-> intel_gt_pm_put_async_untracked()
-> intel_wakeref_put_async()
ASYNC2) wakeref_put_async() callback
-> __gt_park()
-> intel_rps_park()
-> intel_rps_clear_active() [clear ACTIVE]
WITH INTERRUPTS:
-> rps_disable_interrupts()
-> cancel_work_sync(rps->work)
-> rps_reset_interrupts() [rps->pm_iir = 0]
WITHOUT INTERRUPTS (TIMER mode):
-> rps_stop_timer()
-> cancel_work_sync(rps->work)
2) live_rc6_ctx_wa()
-> intel_gt_wait_for_idle()
-> intel_gt_retire_requests_timeout()
-> dma_fence_wait_timeout()
-> ops->wait() [i915_fence_wait()]
-> i915_request_wait_timeout()
-> intel_rps_boost()
-> intel_rps_is_active() [check ACTIVE]
[OPEN RACE WINDOW]
-> queue_work(rps->work)
-> retire_requests()
-> i915_request_retire()
-> intel_rps_dec_waiters() [from 1 to 0]
If ASYNC1 and ASYNC2 would execute during [OPEN RACE WINDOW],
then:
3) rps_work() executes from the workqueue and may satisfy
"(!pm_iir && !client_boost)" test (in TIMER mode rps->pm_iir
is zeroed by an earlier rps_work() call or never gets a new
value after previous intel_rps_unpark() event), so it jumps
to "out" label, bypassing intel_rps_is_active() guard and
executes gen6_gt_pm_unmask_irq();
4) GT is parked and runtime PM wakelock is dropped, so only
a raw reference in __gt_park() ->
intel_display_power_put_async() remains for 100ms, then the
MMIO write in gen6_gt_pm_unmask_irq() detects missing
wakelock via assert_rpm_wakelock_held() and emits
"RPM wakelock ref not held during HW access" tainting kernel.
Commit 3e7abf814193 ("drm/i915: Extract GT render power state management")
dropped the "if (rps->interrupts_enabled)" guard that
gen6_pm_rps_work() had around this unmask in i915_irq.c.
INTEL_RPS_ACTIVE brackets the same window, since it is set in
intel_rps_unpark() before rps_enable_interrupts() and
rps_start_timer() and cleared in intel_rps_park() before
rps_stop_timer() and rps_disable_interrupts().
Skip unmasking when RPS is no longer active (reaching unmask
operation is independent of INTERRUPT mode). This does not
prevent RPS operation from resuming on the next unpark.
In interrupt mode, intel_rps_unpark() calls
rps_enable_interrupts(), which enables and unmasks the PM
interrupts. In timer mode, it calls rps_start_timer(),
restarting periodic engine-busyness evaluation. The timer
generates software RPS events and queues rps_work() directly,
independently of PM interrupt delivery. Neither mode requires
the late worker to unmask interrupts while the GT is parked
(cherry picked from commit ca4a6deadad15b91ee083afe445fa6bdbfb68206) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Fix NULL tty_dev dereference in rfcomm_dev_shutdown
syzbot hit a NULL pointer dereference in rfcomm_dev_shutdown() when an
RFCOMM tty is closed.
rfcomm_dev_add() puts the new device on rfcomm_dev_list first and only
then registers the tty device and saves it in dev->tty_dev. If that
registration fails, dev->tty_dev is never set at all. The device can be
looked up in the meantime, so an open() of /dev/rfcommN gets through
rfcomm_tty_install() and attaches to it. When that tty is closed again,
rfcomm_dev_shutdown() uses dev->tty_dev without checking it:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047]
RIP: 0010:rfcomm_dev_shutdown+0x48/0xb0 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c:131
Call Trace:
tty_port_shutdown+0x1bf/0x220 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:372
tty_port_close+0x4e/0x150 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:705
tty_release+0x359/0x1670 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1718
__fput+0x418/0xa50 fs/file_table.c:512
rfcomm_dev_destruct() already copes with a NULL dev->tty_dev. Add the
same check to rfcomm_dev_shutdown(), so the tty device is only moved
when it was actually registered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment
Rebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race
monitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears
hci_pi(sk)->hdev and drops the device reference under only the socket
lock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for
reading.
Replay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the
last reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev->id. This
can cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a
use-after-free if the old pointer is retained.
The kernel reported:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800
Call Trace:
hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190
__sys_bind+0x166/0x200
__x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The same missing serialization lets hci_send_to_sock() select a socket
for the old device and queue its frame after bind has detached the socket
or installed a new binding.
Take hci_sk_list.lock for writing when clearing the device pointer and
resetting the socket state. This waits for existing replay and delivery
readers to finish before detachment and prevents later readers from
using the old binding. Keep hci_dev_put() outside the critical section
because the final device release can sleep. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Serialize ACL scheduling with channel deletion
hci_chan_sent() selects a channel under RCU but drops the read lock before
accessing chan->conn and returning the channel. The ACL and LE schedulers
then use its packet queue and update its transmit counters without any
protection against channel deletion.
After TX selects a channel and releases RCU, a disconnect command timeout
on the separate request workqueue can run hci_conn_failed() and
l2cap_conn_del(). hci_chan_del() can then unlink the channel, complete
synchronize_rcu(), purge its queue and free it before TX resumes. This
causes use-after-free both in hci_chan_sent() and in its callers.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_chan_sent+0x892/0x9b0
Workqueue: hci0 hci_tx_work
Call Trace:
hci_chan_sent+0x892/0x9b0
hci_tx_work+0x5e6/0xb70
Allocated by task 91:
hci_chan_create+0xe3/0x350
l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x12/0xa30
l2cap_chan_connect+0x110d/0x1b60
l2cap_sock_connect+0x310/0x530
Freed by task 99:
hci_chan_del+0x11f/0x170
l2cap_conn_del+0x4f1/0x800
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x88c/0xd30
hci_conn_failed+0x150/0x250
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3e3/0x800
hci_cmd_sync_run+0x7e/0xc0
hci_abort_conn+0x105/0x1f0
disconnect_sync+0x157/0x290
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290
Hold the existing device mutex across channel selection and transmission
in both schedulers to serialize them with channel teardown. Keep timeout
handling outside the critical sections because hci_link_tx_to() acquires
the same mutex. This also permits the transmit path to sleep, unlike
extending the RCU read-side critical section across packet submission. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tipd: fix uninitialized typec_partner_desc in cd321x_update_work()
cd321x_update_work() passes a stack-allocated typec_partner_desc to
typec_register_partner() after initializing only usb_pd, accessory and
identity.
typec_register_partner() copies attach and deattach from the descriptor
into the partner. With those fields left unset, garbage function pointers
may be stored and later invoked from typec_partner_link_device() when a USB
device is linked to the port. Uninitialized pd_revision and usb_capability
similarly leak stack data through partner sysfs.
Zero-initialize the descriptor so optional callbacks remain NULL and the
remaining fields are zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: fix port tear down use-after-free
Some drivers for multiport devices access port driver data from
completion handlers of shared URBs submitted at attach() or first open()
and stopped at disconnect() or last close(), respectively.
A simple NULL check before accessing the driver data makes sure that a
port state container has at least been allocated, but a completion
handler can still race with port tear down.
Reorder the disconnect handling so that ports are not deregistered (and
their driver data freed) until after all ports have been hung up and the
driver disconnect() callback has run so that all I/O has been stopped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: restore active device pointers after failed sprout
btrfs_init_new_device() switches latest_dev and possibly s_bdev from the
seed device to the new sprout device before creating the first writable
chunks.
If chunk creation or the subsequent sprout setup fails, the error path
releases the new device without switching those pointers back.
btrfs_show_devname() can then dereference the freed latest_dev and crash.
Restore the active device pointers to the latest seed device before
removing and releasing the failed sprout device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: detach failed sprout device from transaction update list
When creating the first metadata chunk for a sprout filesystem,
create_chunk() adds the new device to the transaction dev_update_list
through device->post_commit_list.
If the subsequent system chunk creation fails, btrfs_init_new_device()
aborts the transaction and releases the device while post_commit_list is
still linked. This triggers a warning in btrfs_free_device() and leaves
the transaction list referencing freed memory.
Detach the device while holding chunk_mutex before releasing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: yc: fix memory leak in acp6x_pdm_dma_close()
acp6x_pdm_dma_close() does not free the runtime->private_data buffer
allocated in acp6x_pdm_dma_open(). Add the missing kfree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: check link is beaconing for color change
When trying to do a color change, validate that the link is
beaconing first, to avoid calling the driver with an invalid
link. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing alloc tagging of direct mempool allocations
Commit 1d78d56c43ef ("netfs: Fix folio_queue ENOMEM in writeback by
adding a mempool") added a mempool for the folio_queues and made the
request, subrequest and folio_queue allocations distinguish between
writeback and everything else. Writeback is part of memory reclaim
and must not fail due to ENOMEM, so it allocates under GFP_NOFS
through mempool_alloc(), which may dip into the pool's reserve and,
if that runs empty, wait for elements to be returned. The
GFP_KERNEL paths, which can return -ENOMEM to their callers, invoke
the pool's ->alloc() callback directly instead.
The direct call, however, skips the alloc_hooks() wrapper that the
mempool_alloc() macro provides. The pool callbacks, mempool_alloc_slab()
and mempool_kmalloc(), call kmem_cache_alloc_noprof() and kmalloc_noprof()
and rely on current->alloc_tag having been set by the caller. With
CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=y this leads to
current->alloc_tag not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:161 at __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook
alloc_tag was not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:166 at __alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook
at allocation and free time respectively, as reported when reading
files on a CIFS mount. The allocations are also missing from
/proc/allocinfo.
Wrap the direct ->alloc() invocations in alloc_hooks() with a new
mempool_alloc_noreserve() helper in include/linux/mempool.h, next to
the other alloc_hooks()-wrapped macros such as mempool_alloc(). The
GFP_KERNEL paths keep their failable allocation semantics, they just
get tagged now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
perf_event_open() currently gates perf_allow_kernel() only on
!attr.exclude_kernel.
However, users can still request kernel callchain collection with
attr.exclude_callchain_kernel == 0 even when attr.exclude_kernel == 1.
That still requires kernel profiling privilege, but the existing check
does not enforce it.
Update the permission check to call perf_allow_kernel() when either
kernel sampling is requested or kernel callchains are requested.
This keeps permission checks aligned with requested data and prevents
unprivileged use of kernel callchain capture. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: gadget: dummy-hcd: Fix wait for outstanding request completions
The dummy-hcd driver emulates synchronize_irq() by waiting until its
private callback_usage counter drops to 0 (with the private lock not
held). This counter is incremented whenever a gadget driver callback
occurs (which requires the private lock to be dropped), but not when a
request completion handler is called.
This is an oversight. Request completion is triggered by timer
interrupts (emulating device IRQs in a real UDC), and the interrupt
handlers are supposed to have completed when the synchronize_irq()
emulation routine returns -- they aren't supposed to be in the middle
of a completion callback. If this happens it can lead to a gadget
driver's unbind routine running before all outstanding request
completions have finished, maybe even allowing the gadget driver's
module to be unloaded while a completion handler is still running.
Fix the oversight by incrementing the callback_usage value across
request completion callbacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: aspeed-vhub: cancel wake work on device removal
wake_work is armed from the gadget .wakeup callback to resume suspended
downstream ports, and it is never cancelled in ast_vhub_remove(), so a
work item queued before or during removal can run after devm has freed
vhub and its ports, a use-after-free.
Cancelling the work alone is not sufficient: usb_gadget_wakeup() takes
no lock and the unbind path never clears wakeup_en, so a remote-wakeup
request in flight on another CPU can re-arm the work after the cancel
and before vhub is freed.
ast_vhub_del_dev() already clears d->registered under vhub->lock before
unregistering the gadget. Refuse the wakeup in ast_vhub_udc_wakeup()
once d->registered is clear: the check and the schedule_work() are then
atomic against the unbind, so a wakeup that passed before the flag was
cleared is drained by the cancel_work_sync() after the del_dev loop,
and one that arrives later returns without arming. Also move INIT_WORK()
to the top of ast_vhub_probe(), since the probe error path reuses
ast_vhub_remove() and would otherwise cancel a never-initialized work
item.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmd
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:
u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */
...
con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */
struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.
A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.
Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: midi2: Fix the jack descriptor array sizes
The jack in/out descriptor arrays in struct f_midi2_usb_config have
the size of MAX_CABLES, which look reasonable -- but it turned out to
be incorrect. Namely, the entries for those arrays are added from
both inputs and outputs, hence for each loop cycle, it adds two, ended
up with as twice as the expected size. This inconsistency may result
in potential OOB when a large number of jacks are set up via configfs,
although the max number of cables (the loop count) is limited to
MAX_CABLES.
For addressing it, correct the jack_ins & jack_outs array sizes to
twice, MAX_CABLES * 2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: storage: sierra_ms: reject short SWoC info transfers
sierra_get_swoc_info() requests sizeof(struct swoc_info) (60) bytes
from the device via usb_control_msg(), but its callers only treat a
negative return value as failure. A device that answers the
vendor-specific GetSwocInfo request with a short IN transfer is
therefore accepted, leaving the tail of the freshly allocated
(kmalloc(), non-zeroing) swoc_info buffer uninitialized.
truinst_show() subsequently prints swocInfo->rev, swocInfo->LinuxSKU
and swocInfo->LinuxVer from that buffer into the world-readable
(0444) "truinst" sysfs attribute. An emulated/malicious USB device
(VID 0x1199, PID 0x0fff) can exploit this to disclose up to 5 bytes
of stale kernel heap memory (kmalloc-64) to unprivileged userspace,
once per sysfs read, indefinitely. On kernels built without
init_on_alloc this leaks recently freed heap contents.
Only accept the transfer when the full structure was received.
sierra_ms_init() already retries failed queries, so well-behaved
devices are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
parisc: Increase kernel stack size to 32kb
For 64-bit Linux kernels, increase the default kernel stack size
(THREAD_SIZE_ORDER) to 32 kB, in order to avoid kernel crashes which have been
triggered recently when building the debian vtk9 package with gcc 17:
stackcheck: kworker/u128:0 will most likely overflow kernel stack (sp:179a83af0, stk bottom-top:179a80000-179a84000)
Kernel panic - not syncing: low stack detected by irq handler - check messages
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 30760 Comm: kworker/u128:0 Tainted: G W 6.18.46-dirty #1 NONE
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: 9000/800/rp3440
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-259:0)
Backtrace:
[<000000004022f050>] show_stack+0x70/0x90
[<000000004022378c>] dump_stack_lvl+0x124/0x190
[<000000004022382c>] dump_stack+0x34/0x48
[<000000004020212c>] vpanic+0x204/0x648
[<00000000402025c4>] panic+0x54/0x58
[<0000000040232230>] do_cpu_irq_mask+0x3f8/0x440
[<0000000040227070>] intr_return+0x0/0xc |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash
fixes the following crash on driver initialization:
|BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000158
|Faulting instruction address: 0xc0566b40
|Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
|BE PAGE_SIZE=4K PowerPC 44x Platform
|Modules linked in:
|CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: GW 7.3.0-rc3+ #1
|Tainted: [W]=WARN
|Hardware name: MyBook Live APM821XX 0x12c41c83 PowerPC 44x Platform
|NIP: c0566b40 LR: c05648f8 CTR: c04c1e9c
|REGS: c1053a20 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: GW (7.3.0-rc3+)
|MSR: 0002b000 <CE,EE,FP,ME> CR: 24008808 XER: 00000000
|DEAR: 00000158 ESR: 00000000
|GPR00: c05648f8 c1053b10 c1063600 c1030000 c5ab3000 00000000 [...]
|GPR08: 00000002 00000000 00000000 c1053b40 84002808 00000000 [...]
|GPR16: cfffd210 00000002 c0beafcc cfffc960 00000000 c1030644 [...]
|GPR24: c0beafbc c1037000 00000000 0000000a 00000000 c1030000 [...]
|NIP [c0566b40] phy_link_topo_add_phy+0x2c/0x1d0
|LR [c05648f8] phy_attach_direct+0x1a4/0x368
|Call Trace:
|[c1053b10] [c0811e04] klist_put+0x54/0xb4 (unreliable)
|[c1053b40] [c05648f8] phy_attach_direct+0x1a4/0x368
|[c1053b70] [c0564ae8] phy_connect_direct+0x2c/0x60
|[c1053b90] [c056c7a8] of_phy_connect+0x50/0x74
|[c1053bc0] [c0572a88] emac_probe+0xd50/0x119c
|[c1053c90] [c04cb770] platform_probe+0x74/0xa4
|[c1053cb0] [c04c8f08] really_probe+0x120/0x2b0
|[c1053cd0] [c04c9254] __driver_probe_device+0x1bc/0x1fc
|[c1053d00] [c04c9334] driver_probe_device+0x38/0xa8
|[c1053d30] [c04c9560] __driver_attach+0xf4/0x10c
|[c1053d50] [c04c6af8] bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xd0
|[c1053d90] [c04c7c34] bus_add_driver+0xcc/0x1ec
|[c1053dc0] [c04c9f6c] driver_register+0xcc/0x110
|[c1053de0] [c0aa3f40] emac_init+0x1c4/0x200
This bug showed up starting with v7.3-rc1. At the NIP in
phy_link_topo_add_phy() is a netdev_need_ops_lock() check.
This was added by the following
commit ded86da4bbb7 ("net: ethtool: relax ethnl_req_get_phydev() locking assertion")
The bug shows up because at the time of_phy_connect() was called, the
netdev_ops were *not yet* determined. My fix is to move the code that
sets netdev_ops+commac.ops+ethtool_ops further up as emac_init_config()
derives that by looking at the device-tree and sets the required
dev->phy_mode accordingly.
During review, the Sashiko bot's AI stated that the commac assignment
became a dead store. Great catch! To keep the original behavior as-is,
one mentioned option "set dev->commac.ops = &emac_commac_ops only in
the non-gige case?" sounded like a great plan. So the dev->commac.ops
assignment for the non-gige-case moves into the else block.
This patch was tested on a WD MyBook Live (RGMII). the device now works again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: remove the fsnotify marks of a mount namespace in process context
mnt_ns_release() drops the last passive reference of a mount namespace
and removes its fanotify marks via fsnotify_mntns_delete(). That takes
the mutex of every group with a mark on the namespace and the spinlock
of the connector. Fine from process context. But mnt_ns_tree_remove()
hands the reference the namespace was allocated with to call_rcu() and
so the marks are removed from the RCU softirq:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:623
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/3
__mutex_lock+0x113/0x24b0
fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x11b/0x3d0
mnt_ns_release_rcu+0x57/0xa0
rcu_core+0x6b6/0x1e40
and lockdep complains about the connector lock being taken from softirq
context. A fanotify group with a FAN_MARK_MNTNS mark on the mount
namespace of another task is all that's needed. Root in a user
namespace can do that for a mount namespace it owns. The task exits and
the namespace is freed with the mark still on it.
Remove the marks in free_mnt_ns() before the namespace is handed to RCU.
That runs in process context once the last active reference is gone. A
mark is added through a file descriptor to the namespace which holds an
active reference so no mark can show up after that. |
