| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: guard mac_header adjustment after IPv6 defrag
nf_ct_frag6_reasm() slides the packet head forward to drop the IPv6
fragment header and then unconditionally advances skb->mac_header:
skb->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
On the NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT defrag path the skb has no link-layer header
yet, so skb->mac_header is still the "not set" sentinel (u16)~0U. Adding
sizeof(struct frag_hdr) wraps it to a small value (0xffff + 8 == 7),
after which skb_mac_header_was_set() wrongly reports a MAC header is
present and skb_mac_header() points into the headroom.
The reassembler has done this unconditional add since it was introduced;
it was harmless while mac_header was a bare pointer, but wrong once
mac_header became a u16 offset whose unset state is the ~0U sentinel
tested by skb_mac_header_was_set(). The sibling net/ipv6/reassembly.c
does the same relocation and does guard the adjustment; mirror the
guard here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off
In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307),
lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH.
When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the
assignment
attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off);
underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1,
data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size
to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to
4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation.
The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287
catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk
and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all
attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and
reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered.
Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source.
Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via
pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the
post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails
at -22 from mi_enum_attr).
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Graphics Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| LibRaw through 0.22.2 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read in LibRaw::parseNikonMakernote() that allows attackers to read past a short ShotInfo buffer. Attackers can supply a crafted Nikon NEF/TIFF with a 5-byte ShotInfo tag declaring version 243 to crash applications decoding the image. |
| GNU LibreDWG through 0.14.8612 contains a global out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the AcDs decoder acds_private() that allows attackers to read beyond a static table via an unchecked schema property type index. Attackers can supply a crafted R2004 or R2010+ DWG file with a large 'schdat' property type value to crash dwgread, dwg2dxf, or any application using LibreDWG. |
| WildMIDI through 0.5.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the HMP parser _WM_ParseNewHmp() that allows attackers to read beyond buffers via underflowed chunk lengths. Attackers can supply a crafted .hmp file with a chunk length of 0-12 that wraps to roughly 4 GB, crashing applications or exposing heap bytes through WildMidi_GetInfo(). |
| Game Music Emu (libgme) through 0.6.5 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the AY loader get_data function caused by an integer underflow in the track-table bounds check. Attackers can supply a crafted ZXAYEMUL file with an oversized track table to read past the file buffer via gme_track_info or gme_start_track, crashing libgme consumers. |
| Zziplib through 0.13.80 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in zzip/mmapped.c that allows attackers to over-read heap memory via a crafted ZIP central directory. Attackers can craft an end-of-central-directory record placing the first entry near the buffer end, causing zzip_disk_entry_strdup_name to read past the buffer and crash the application. |
| GNOME libgxps through 0.3.2 contains a heap out-of-bounds read in path_geometry_start_element() that allows attackers to read past allocations via crafted PolyBezierSegment or PolyQuadraticBezierSegment Points attributes. Attackers can supply a point count not divisible by three or two in a crafted XPS document to crash consumers like Evince and render adjacent heap memory into output. |
| catdoc through 0.95 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in copy_unicode_string() in src/xlsparse.c that allows attackers to read past buffers via an unchecked string character count. Attackers can supply a crafted .xls file declaring 0xFFFF two-byte characters in LABEL, STRING, or SST records to disclose adjacent memory through xls2csv output or crash the process. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Volume Manager Extension Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of Delta ISPSoft. |
| This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of Delta ISPSoft. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm era: fix out-of-bounds memory access for non-zero start sector
dm-era tracks writes in target-relative blocks, but era_map() calculates
the writeset block before applying the target offset. Tables with a
non-zero start sector can therefore pass an absolute mapped-device block
to metadata_current_marked().
If the absolute block is beyond the current writeset size,
writeset_marked() tests past the end of the in-core bitset. KASAN reports
this as a vmalloc-out-of-bounds access.
Apply the target offset before calculating the era block so writeset
lookups use the target-relative block number. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer
core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() and core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move()
hand the raw PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter buffer to
target_parse_pr_out_transport_id() without telling it how many bytes are
valid. For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b),
iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() locates the ",i,0x" ISID separator with
an unbounded strstr() (and on the error path prints the name with a further
unbounded "%s"). An initiator can submit a TransportID whose iSCSI name
contains neither a ",i,0x" substring nor a NUL terminator, filling the
parameter list to its end, so the scan runs off the end of the buffer.
When the parameter list spans more than one page the buffer is a multi-page
vmap (transport_kmap_data_sg()), so the over-read walks into the trailing
vmalloc guard page and oopses (KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in strstr). It
is reachable by any fabric that delivers a PR OUT to a device exported
through an iSCSI TPG, including a guest via vhost-scsi.
Pass the number of received bytes down to the parser and validate the iSCSI
TransportID's own self-described length (ADDITIONAL LENGTH + 4) once, up
front: reject it if it is below the spc4r17 minimum or larger than the
received buffer, then bound the separator search, the ISID walk and the
name copy by that length. This is the length check the callers already
perform after the parse (core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() compares tid_len
against tpdl, core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() validates it against
data_length), moved ahead of the scan. Also drop the unbounded "%s" of the
unterminated name.
Add per-format explicit name-length checks before copying into i_str,
rather than silently truncating with min_t: for FORMAT CODE 00b reject if
the descriptor body (tid_len - 4 bytes) cannot fit in
i_str[TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN]; for FORMAT CODE 01b reject if the name portion
(from &buf[4] up to the separator) cannot fit. Both checks make the bounds
intent explicit at each format branch.
While here, also reject a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID whose ",i,0x"
separator sits at the very end of the descriptor: that leaves an empty ISID
and points the returned port nexus pointer at buf + tid_len, one past the
descriptor, which the registration code (__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg(),
__core_scsi3_alloc_registration()) then dereferences as the ISID string --
the same over-read of the parameter buffer for a malformed descriptor. |
