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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-116240 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with check_access_permission(), which builds the absolute path with get_abs_path(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: - Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. - Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. - Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also checked the path appended to itself. - Creating a folder could create one in another user's directory. The fix makes check_access_permission() return the path it checked and every caller act on that path, decodes folder paths once, and opens, deletes and renames files relative to directories opened from the storage directory without following symbolic links. Desktop mode is not affected. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116241 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 9.9 Critical |
| pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool wraps a user's query export in a psql \copy (...) TO command and checks that the query's parentheses are balanced so that nothing can escape the wrapper. The check rejected a backslash inside a single-quoted string, but not inside a double-quoted identifier, where it treated the next double quote as closing the identifier. psql's \copy parser applies the connection's escape character to whichever quote opened a token, so with standard_conforming_strings off a backslash-escaped double quote does not close the identifier. pgAdmin's and psql's view of the quoting then diverged, a closing parenthesis hidden from the check ended the \copy (...) wrapper, and a following TO PROGRAM clause was executed by psql on the pgAdmin host, as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, before the server rejected the statement. An ordinary database role can turn standard_conforming_strings off for itself, and the Import/Export Data permission is granted to non-administrators by default. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-17566. The fix rejects any backslash inside a double-quoted identifier, as was already done for single-quoted strings, since its meaning depends on a server setting that cannot be known reliably when the query is validated. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116242 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| pgAdmin 4 opens SSH tunnels with the sshtunnel library but gave it neither host_pkey_directories nor ssh_config_file, so it always loaded the unencrypted private keys in ~/.ssh of the operating-system account running pgAdmin, read that account's ~/.ssh/config (IdentityFile, User, HostName, ProxyCommand) for the tunnel host, and could use its ssh-agent. In server mode any user could therefore configure a tunnel to a host that accepts the service account's key, with no credentials of their own or with an identity file that did not exist in their storage, and reach it as that account. The fix makes tunnels in server mode use only the identity file or password the user configured: the service account's keys, configuration and agent are no longer used, and an identity file that cannot be found in the user's storage is reported instead of falling back to ~/.ssh. Desktop mode is unchanged. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116243 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 7.5 High |
| pgAdmin 4 runs pg_dump, pg_restore, pg_dumpall and psql from the binary path a user sets in their preferences. In server mode the binary path was refused only when it lay under the per-user storage directory (STORAGE_DIR), not under a SHARED_STORAGE directory, which ordinary users can upload files to. A user could therefore upload an executable to shared storage, point their binary path at it, and have pgAdmin run it as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. On POSIX, files created through pgAdmin are not executable, so this is exploitable where any file with an executable name can run, such as Windows server mode. The fix checks the binary path against every SHARED_STORAGE directory as well, after expanding $DIR, collapsing ".." and resolving symbolic links, compares directories in a way a different spelling on a case-insensitive filesystem cannot bypass, refuses a path containing a NUL, and enforces the check wherever binary paths are resolved, including for the PSQL tool. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116244 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential cache while that user was connecting. The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116245 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| libpq looks a connection service up in the service file of the operating-system account running pgAdmin 4, and an entry there can hold a password or name a password file or client certificate. In server mode any user could set a server's Service, or a "service" connection parameter, to one of those entries and connect with its credentials. A PGPASSWORD or PGSERVICE variable set for that account was likewise used by libpq for every connection without a value of its own and passed on to the utilities, and pg_dumpall read a maintenance database name such as "service=..." as a connection string. The fix adds the SERVER_MODE_ALLOWED_SERVICES setting, empty by default: in server mode only a listed service can be used, the servicefile parameter is refused, and PGPASSWORD and PGSERVICE are removed from pgAdmin's environment at startup. The allowlist is checked again on the final connection string, and the pg_dumpall database name is wrapped as a connection string. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116246 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| To pass a server's password to psql and to the utilities pgAdmin 4 runs as background processes, the server manager wrote it into pgAdmin's own process environment: as PGPASSWORD for the PSQL tool, and under a per-process variable for a utility. Nothing removed it afterwards. pgAdmin's environment is shared by every user's requests and copied into every process it starts, so in server mode another user's later PSQL session or utility inherited the password, and libpq used PGPASSWORD for any connection made without a password of its own, letting one user connect with another user's saved password. The fix puts the password only into the environment built for the process that needs it and starts psql with a copy of pgAdmin's environment instead of the environment itself. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116247 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| When a server in pgAdmin 4 had no password file, client certificate or client key configured, or the configured one could not be found, pgAdmin left the parameter out of the connection and libpq fell back to the defaults of the operating-system account running pgAdmin: ~/.pgpass, ~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt and postgresql.key, or PGPASSFILE, PGSSLCERT and PGSSLKEY. In server mode any user could therefore connect to a server with the service account's saved passwords or client certificate, and supplying only a copy of its public certificate was enough for libpq to pair it with the service account's private key. A pg_service.conf entry, or a maintenance database name read as a connection string by pg_dumpall, could bring the same files back for the utilities. The fix gives each of these parameters a value in server mode, the user's own file or otherwise a path that can never be opened, in the connection string, in the environment of the utilities and in the --dbname connection string that ranks above a service entry. Desktop mode is unchanged. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116248 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.8 Medium |
| In pgAdmin 4 server mode only administrators are meant to share a server with all users; the server dialog shows the Shared switch only to them. The create and update endpoints of the server API, however, stored the "shared" flag and shared username they were sent, so any user able to register a server could share one with every other user. The servers.json import had a similar gap: a non-administrator's "Shared" entries were removed only after validation, so a file that also held an invalid entry could create a shared server. A shared server carries no credentials, so this gives no direct access. It lets a user plant a server, named to look trusted, in every other user's tree and pointing at a host the user controls; anyone who then connects to it presents their own database password to that host. The fix refuses a non-administrator's request that would share a server with HTTP 403, prunes a non-administrator's shared entries from a servers.json import before validating it, and warns at startup about servers shared earlier by non-administrators. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116249 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.4 High |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 resolves a server's password file, SSL certificate, key, CRL and SSH tunnel identity file relative to the user's storage directory, but get_complete_file_path() only stripped leading slashes before joining the two. A path such as "../<another user>/.pgpass", set through the server dialog, the REST API or a servers.json import, therefore named another user's file, and connecting used that user's saved passwords, client certificate or SSH key. The sslkeylogfile connection parameter was passed to libpq unchanged, so a path outside storage let libpq create or append a file as the account running pgAdmin. make_conninfo() also quoted connection parameter values but not their names, so a crafted parameter name could smuggle additional keyword=value pairs past these checks. The fix requires the resolved path, with symbolic links followed, to stay inside the user's storage directory or the named shared storage directory, confines sslkeylogfile the same way, and accepts only exact libpq keywords as connection parameter names. A refused path or keyword is reported instead of letting libpq fall back to a default. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116250 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path a user gives for a file in their storage directory with check_access_permission() and then opened it by name. Several places opened it with a plain open() or handed the path to a utility that opened it later: the servers.json export and import and the import file listing, and the files given to pg_dump, pg_dumpall, pg_restore and psql by Backup, Restore and Import/Export Data. A symbolic link swapped in at the file or at any parent directory between the check and the open redirected the operation outside the storage directory, so a file could be written, overwritten or read, or loaded into a table, as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. A hard link to an outside file, which O_NOFOLLOW does not detect, and a FIFO, which could hang a request, had the same effect. CVE-2026-86861 fixed this for the File Manager's save_file; these were the remaining paths. Exploitation requires creating such a link or FIFO inside the user's storage directory. pgAdmin offers no way to do so, and the per-user storage directories belong to the pgAdmin account, so this requires write access to the storage backend as a different operating-system user, for example a shared or network-mounted storage directory, and winning the race. The fix opens each file by walking down from the storage directory one component at a time with O_NOFOLLOW, accepting only a regular file with one link, and passes the utilities the open descriptor (/dev/fd/N) on Linux. Error messages no longer include the server path. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116251 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 4.2 Medium |
| pgAdmin 4 did not invalidate a user's existing sessions when their password changed, either through the user's own change password dialog or through an administrator resetting it in User Management. A session established before the change, for example on another device or by someone who had obtained the old password or a session cookie, therefore stayed logged in after the change, which is the step a user or administrator takes precisely to cut such access off. It remained usable until it expired. The fix rotates the user's session identifier (fs_uniquifier) whenever the password is changed, so every other session of that user is logged out. The session that made the change is logged in again and keeps its database connections. Saved server passwords, including those for shared servers, are re-encrypted under the new key; any that cannot be decrypted are cleared and the user is told. If re-encryption fails, the sessions are still revoked and the saved passwords are cleared rather than the change failing. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116252 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| pgAdmin 4's materialized view refresh passed the target database's name to psql's --dbname argument unchanged. libpq treats a --dbname value containing "=" (or a postgresql:// URI) as a full connection string, whose keywords override the host, port and other settings pgAdmin had supplied. A database whose name is such a string, which any role with CREATEDB can create, therefore redirected the psql process pgAdmin starts for the refresh to a host and port of the creator's choosing, and the connecting user's saved server password was presented to that endpoint. It also let the pgAdmin host be made to open connections to arbitrary addresses. The same weakness was fixed for Backup, Restore, Maintenance and Import/Export Data in earlier releases (CVE-2026-86862); the materialized view refresh was the remaining caller. The fix routes the name through the same database_conninfo() helper, so libpq treats it strictly as a database name. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63115 | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| ActivityPub is a multi-tenant ActivityPub server for Ghost, built with Fedify. From 1.0.0 until 1.2.6, the `Undo` handler allows a remote federated server to cause the service to act on a `follow` or `repost` as though the activity came from a different account. This permits removal of an existing `follow` relationship or `repost` belonging to another account without that account's involvement. No private data is exposed and content is not modified; the affected relationships can be re-established. Services proxying to Ghost's hosted ActivityPub server have already been updated, while self-hosted services require an updated image and redeployment. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.6. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107044 | 2026-10-30 | 7.5 High | ||
| Insecure permissions in ProjectMAXS MAXS Main v0.5.19 (versionCode 19) allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily manipulate the app's MAXS command/transport mechanism. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119335 | 1 Pi-hole | 1 Pi-hole | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| Pi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. Prior to 6.5, advanced/Scripts/utils.sh getFTLPID() attempts to validate the pihole-owned /run/pihole-FTL.pid file with expr "${FTL_PID}" : "[^[:digit:]]", but this rejects only values whose first character is not a digit. An attacker with code execution as the pihole user can write a digit-prefixed arithmetic expression to the pihole-owned PID file. Root-run pihole subcommands then evaluate [[ "$pid" -eq "-1" ]], causing Bash to recursively evaluate array subscripts and execute command substitution as root. This bypasses the content-validation portion of the CVE-2026-41489 remediation while leaving its hardcoded PID-file path protection intact. This issue is fixed in version 6.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55098 | 1 Basekick-labs | 1 Arc | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to the repository-verified 26.06.2 repair, the remediation of `CVE-2026-47735` leaves a cross-database authorization bypass through DuckDB table-valued I/O functions. In `internal/database/sandbox.go`, `allowed_directories` uses `cfg.LocalStorageRoot`, configured by `storage.local_path`, while `enable_external_access=false` blocks access outside that entire multi-tenant root. `GetStoragePath` in `internal/storage/util.go` stores all databases beneath it. In `internal/api/query.go`, `extractTableReferences` skips names followed by an opening parenthesis and `checkQueryPermissions` allows queries with no extracted table references, including tokens with `permissions: []`. The `userSQLReadParquetPattern` denylist catches literal `read_parquet(` and the earlier protection also blocks `arc_partition_agg(`, but misses the `parquet_scan` alias and `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_blob`, `read_csv_auto`, `read_json` and `read_text`. A request to `POST /api/v1/query` using these unblocked functions passes `ValidateSQLRequest` and `convertSQLToStoragePaths` without tenant authorization, allowing reads and enumeration of other databases' time-series data, schema and per-column value-range statistics within the allowlisted root. The sandbox still blocks out-of-root OS files and HTTP SSRF, and the sibling SQLite token database outside the root is not exposed by this mechanism. The earlier 26.06.1 remediation does not comprehensively deny these I/O functions. Repository tag 26.06.2 contains the I/O-function repair and supplies the provisional remediation boundary; conflicting advisory affected-version statements require curator adjudication. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119337 | 1 Infiniflow | 1 Ragflow | 2026-10-30 | 7.1 High |
| RAGFlow is an open-source RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) engine. From 0.25.2 until 0.27.3, POST /api/v1/agents/chat/completions invokes completion_openai and returns through the openai-compatible branch before UserCanvasService.accessible() checks whether the caller may access the requested agent. An authenticated user who knows another user's private agent UUID can execute that Only me workflow and read its output across the user or tenant boundary; configured tools may also cause side effects, but stronger impacts were not demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119342 | 1 Stirling | 1 Stirling Pdf | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium |
| Stirling-PDF is a locally hosted web application that facilitates various operations on PDF files. From 2.13.1 until 2.13.2, the POST /api/v1/convert/svg/pdf endpoint renders attacker-supplied SVG through Apache Batik, and a scheme-less root-relative image reference bypasses SvgSanitizer.isExternalUrl() before Batik resolves it against the file:///input.svg document base as a same-origin local file. The convert() and addSvgAsPage() paths in app/core/src/main/java/stirling/software/SPDF/utils/SvgToPdf.java can then render image-decodable server files into the returned PDF when sanitization is enabled, including without authentication on login-disabled deployments or with non-admin access when login is enabled. The issue discloses PNG, JPG, GIF, or SVG content and provides an existence oracle only for image-decodable paths; plain text, binary files, directories, XInclude text, external entities, explicit file URLs, and tested HTTP references are not disclosed through this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 2.13.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62254 | 1 Libredwg | 1 Libredwg | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| LibreDWG is a free C library to read and write DWG files. Prior to 0.14, a specially crafted R13-R2000 DWG can trigger algorithmic resource exhaustion in `decode_R13_R2000` in `src/decode.c`. The class-decoding loop performs `realloc` on every iteration without a sanity check on `num_classes`. Manipulating that field forces an extremely slow allocation loop and denial of service when the file is parsed. Running the parser in a sandbox with memory limits is a workaround rather than a remediation. This issue is fixed in version 0.14. | ||||