| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: frequency: adf4377: Fully initialize clk_init_data and clk_parent_data
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
adf4377_clk_register() fills in init.parent_data, and assumes that
init.parent_names is NULL. However, the latter is uninitialized, and
thus may cause a crash.
Similarly, adf4377_clk_register() fills in only parent_data.fw_name,
leaving other members of the clk_parent_data structure uninitialized.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists in alloc_bulk
Syzkaller repeatedly triggered UAF splats related to nodes in
waiting_for_gp_ttrace within the bpf memalloc:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881572cd080 by task syz.4.470/5112
...
llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
alloc_bulk+0x193/0x460 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:229
bpf_mem_refill+0x386/0x560 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:436
Freed by task 14:
...
__free_rcu kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:281 [inline]
__free_rcu_tasks_trace+0x48/0xd0 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:291
rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs+0x1ec/0x3e0 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:571
rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x13d/0x220 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:621
rcu_tasks_kthread+0xf3/0x120 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:651
The reason is that the UAF occurs after the RCU Tasks Trace GP expires:
when the __free_rcu() callback runs, there is no synchronization
protecting llist_del_all() against concurrent alloc_bulk() operating on
waiting_for_gp_ttrace, leading to the race condition below:
CPU0 CPU1
__free_rcu (RCU Tasks Trace callback)
alloc_bulk
llist_del_first(&c->waiting_for_gp_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
free_all(llist_del_all(&c->waiting_for_gp_ttrace))
llist_for_each_safe(pos, t, llnode)
free_one(pos);
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); <-- trigger UAF
} while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
In addition, there is also a theoretical race condition on the
free_by_rcu_ttrace list. This race requires two preconditions: an
in-flight Tasks Trace GP keeping c->call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress == 1,
and concurrent cross-CPU frees repopulating c->free_by_rcu_ttrace with
new nodes. Under these conditions, the following scenario triggers UAF:
// CPU0
// irq work is still busy (on PREEMPT_RT)
alloc_bulk()
llist_del_first(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
// CPU1
bpf_mem_alloc_destroy()
WRITE_ONCE(c->draining, true)
// wait for CPU0
irq_work_sync()
// CPU2
do_call_rcu_ttrace(tgt(CPU0))
if (c->draining) {
llist_del_all(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
free_all()
}
// CPU0 continue
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); <-- trigger UAF
while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
Fix this by introducing a raw spinlock to synchronize the concurrent
consumption on waiting_for_gp_ttrace and free_by_rcu_ttrace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops")
int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
switch (skops->op) {
case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */
...
}
}
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.
Before patch:
0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v
After patch:
0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9
1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock
2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0
3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v
6: goto pc+2
7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
8: r1 = 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Skip cond_resched() in inet_csk_listen_stop() under BPF context
bpf_sock_destroy() runs from the tcp iterator, under rcu_read_lock(). If
the sock is a listener that still has children in its accept queue,
tcp_abort() ends up in inet_csk_listen_stop() and the cond_resched()
there trips the debug check:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1523
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 628, name: test_progs
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
locks held by test_progs/628: 3, last CPU#3:
#0: ffff8881158cee18 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x56/0x1210
#1: ffff8881106bb858 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x32b/0x4b0
#2: ffffffffb435af20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_iter_run_prog+0x46b/0xde0
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 628 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G W 7.2.0+ #65 PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc1/0xf0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__might_resched+0x3d2/0x610
inet_csk_listen_stop+0x7b/0xbf0
tcp_abort+0x23b/0x3b0
bpf_sock_destroy+0xfc/0x140
bpf_prog_448133d24601754f_iter_tcp6_server+0x81/0x8a
bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0
bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0
bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210
vfs_read+0x197/0xe40
ksys_read+0x119/0x240
__x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fad39b28aca
RSP: 002b:00007ffc381c61c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc381c6a88 RCX: 00007fad39b28aca
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00007ffc381c6250 RDI: 0000000000000014
RBP: 00007ffc381c61e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055f077c1bbb0 R15: 00007fad3a0f3000
</TASK>
The commit that added the kfunc already guards lock_sock() in tcp_abort()
and udp_abort() with has_current_bpf_ctx(), but missed the listener path.
Do the same for the cond_resched(). The loop runs inside the iterator's
rcu_read_lock(), it must not reschedule or report a quiescent state there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: Dequeue pending mesh_send_sync entries on cancel
In send_cancel(), pending mesh_tx objects are removed from the
hdev->mesh_pending list and freed via mesh_send_complete(). However, if
a mesh transmission was already queued onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list via
mesh_next(), the queued entry retains a raw pointer to mesh_tx.
When hci_cmd_sync_work later processes the entry, it attempts to execute
mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete using
the already freed mesh_tx pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by invoking hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the
target mesh_tx before completing it. If the entry is found and dequeued,
its destroy callback will complete and free the object; otherwise,
mesh_send_complete() is called directly.
Additionally, ensure the transmission queue advances after cancellation
or errors. In mesh_send_start_complete(), call mesh_next() on error
unless err is -ECANCELED, because hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() holds
hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock and calling mesh_next() synchronously would
deadlock. Instead, advance the queue in send_cancel() once the lock is
released and if no transmission is in progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix divide-by-zero in btf_struct_walk()
When an access goes past the struct and the last member is a flexible
array, btf_struct_walk() folds the offset back into a single element with
(off - moff) % t->size, but never checks that the element type has a size.
BTF takes an empty struct, so this in program BTF
/* event could be empty */
struct event {
#ifdef HAVE_TIMESTAMP
__u64 ts;
#endif
};
struct batch {
int nr;
struct event events[];
};
divides by zero at prog load time. Getting there needs a PTR_TO_BTF_ID that
is not MEM_ALLOC, e.g. a plain read of a local kptr stashed in a map from a
sleepable program.
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
RIP: 0010:btf_struct_walk+0x53f/0x1570
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btf_struct_access+0x42a/0xcd0
check_ptr_to_btf_access+0x4dc/0x1160
check_mem_access+0x3a45/0x8740
check_load_mem+0x36a/0xd10
do_check_common+0x3ef0/0xb210
bpf_check+0x6d3b/0x8580
bpf_prog_load+0xf7c/0x2720
__sys_bpf+0xa83/0x3690
__x64_sys_bpf+0xc7/0x150
x64_sys_call+0x1f3f/0x27e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Reject a zero-sized element type. The fixed array path in the same function
already bails out on the same thing:
btf_struct_walk()
...
/* skip empty array */
if (moff == mtrue_end)
continue;
msize /= total_nelems; |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Fix race in _destroy_pages_crste()
Use READ_ONCE() in _destroy_pages_crste() to read the crste, avoid
dereferencing the pointer multiple times. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Add missing srcu in kvm_s390_set_irq_state()
Like kvm_s390_inject_vcpu(), kvm_s390_set_irq_state() also needs the
kvm->srcu or the slots lock when performing the Store status operation.
Fix by taking kvm->srcu in kvm_s390_set_irq_state(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: rohm-bu27034: Fix infinite delay on error
When reading an integration-time fails, the code will use error code to
compute the sleep time.
Fix this by using the smallest integration time as a default if
reading fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad4030: fix invalid oversampling_ratio validation
In ad4030_set_avg_frame_len(), the logarithm is calculated before input
validation. Passing zero or negative values leads to an undefined result
from ilog2().
Validate that the input is strictly positive prior to computing its
logarithm. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
squashfs: Add dictionary size range check to prevent shift-out-of-bounds
When an abnormal SquashFS image (COMP_OPTS flag is 1 but dictionary size
is 0) is mounted, and performs shift operations using dictionarysize, the
shift exponent is -1, causing a shift-out-of-bounds.
Detail as below:
squashfs_comp_opts(msblk, buffer, length)
squashfs_xz_comp_opts()
if (comp_opts)
n = ffs(opts->dict_size) - 1;<----opts->dict_size=0, n=-1
if (opts->dict_size != (1 << n) && opts->dict_size !=
(1 << n) + (1 << (n + 1))) <----shift-out-of-bounds
Fix it by adding a dictionary size range check before the shift operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: pac1934: check ACPI label duplication
A label duplication failure currently reaches the terminating-byte
write. Release the ACPI result and abort before accessing the missing
label; earlier labels are managed by devres.
Detected by static analysis and reviewed with AI-assisted source auditing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: adi-axi-adc: Initialize state mutex
The AXI ADC register access paths serialize transactions with st->lock,
but probe does not initialize it. Initialize the mutex before registering
the backend. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: kionix-kx022a: Prevent memory leak and fix state
The driver allocates memory for samples at buffer enable path. If regmap
operation fails in the kx022a_fifo_enable() at the buffer enable path, the
allocated memory is never freed. Furthermore, the state information and
previous hardware configuration(s) aren't undone, potentially leaving
WMI interrupts and buffers enabled, or driver state flags wrong.
Free the memory and revert the hardware configuration and state flags on
error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone
cifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of
cifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache
against the server-side copy the way the other server-side range
operations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range()
and smb3_insert_range()) do.
cifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with
filemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping's
invalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the
copychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on
the target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only
i_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not
drain outstanding I/O.
As a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the
server-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region
just written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class
of corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b ("smb/client: flush dirty data
before punching a hole") and has been seen randomly in generic/363
against Windows Server.
Fix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target
mapping's invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the
destination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io()
on the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only
the target inode's invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely
flushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via
lock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock,
matching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes
that same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate
steps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to
avoid a range underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: flush and commit data before querying allocated ranges
The mode 0 / FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE fallocate emulation for small interior
ranges in smb3_simple_fallocate_range() issues
FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES and zero-fills any sub-range the server
reports as an unallocated hole, to force block allocation without
changing file contents.
This is unsafe against Windows servers. Per the Win32 documentation,
FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES only reports ranges that *may* contain
nonzero data and is explicitly not coherent with recently written data:
"a call to FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES [after writing to a network
file] would not necessarily return a correct list of allocated
regions. To ensure coherency [...] flush the data to the file"
fsx (generic/363) reproduces the resulting corruption against Windows
Server 2022: a range is written, an uncached read returns the data, yet
the next FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES on that range reports it as a whole
hole, so the emulation overwrites live data with zeroes. A network trace
confirmed the WRITE, the READ returning data and the query returning an
empty range list within microseconds. Samba does not exhibit this; its
query is coherent with the written data.
Write back the dirty pages, drain any outstanding I/O and issue an SMB2
FLUSH to force the server to commit the data before querying the
allocated ranges, so the query reflects the data actually present.
With this, generic/363 passes against both Windows Server 2022 and Samba
over 100000 fsx operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Don't access a DP tunnel after its DPRX read was canceled
tb_dp_dprx_work() checks ->dprx_canceled before it takes tb->lock so it
misses a tb_dp_dprx_stop() that could not cancel the already running
work. It then polls the DPRX capabilities and runs the callback for a
tunnel that has already been torn down while the domain is suspending or
going away.
This can be hit by cancelling the DPRX read from outside the ordered
tb->wq: During suspend tb_disconnect_and_release_dp() does just this and
with a later patch tb_stop() will do it as well. The latter in combination
with the Apple NHI where the DPRX read never completed is how I hit
this.
Check the flag with tb->lock held instead and check it again in
tb_dp_tunnel_active() because the callback runs after the lock has been
dropped again.
Also clear the flag in tb_dp_dprx_start() so that it only ever describes
the work that is currently in flight. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Fix domain reference leak when DPRX read is canceled
tb_tunnel_one_dp() takes a domain reference which is only dropped once
tb_dp_tunnel_active() has run on the work queue. If that work is
cancelled that reference is leaked. Since
commit f5cc545f5969 ("thunderbolt: Wait for tb_domain_release() to
complete when driver is removed") instead of just leaking memory this
now also blocks in the completion wait forever when unbinding the
driver.
This can be triggered whenever a DP tunnel is torn down before the DPRX
read has completed, e.g. by unplugging within the timeout, and then
unbinding the driver.
That reference only exists to keep the domain around while the DPRX work
is scheduled so let the work itself own it: take it in tb_dp_dprx_start()
and drop it in both places that end the work. Get/put are then paired
inside the same file and it doesn't matter anymore if the callback ever
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Tear down inactive DP tunnels when the domain is stopped
tb_stop() only tears down DMA tunnels so a DP tunnel that is still
waiting for dprx_work to complete keeps that work queued while the
routers are removed and the control channel is stopped. The work only
stops once the DPRX timeout has passed and because it requeues itself
until then the flush_workqueue() in tb_domain_remove() won't wait for its
final run. The callback then runs against a domain that is already torn
down. A reference to that domain is kept so the completion waiting for
that domain to disappear in unbind will block until the timeout is
eventually reached.
Tear down DP tunnels that are not active yet as well which also cancels
that work. Tunnels for displays that are already alive are untouched and
keep working. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Wait for an RCU tasks grace period before freeing trampoline progs
When a prog is detached from a trampoline, it is freed after an RCU
grace period, or an RCU tasks trace one if it is sleepable. This covers
the tasks that are running the prog, since the prog's enter helper takes
the matching read lock before the prog is called. On a preemptible
kernel, it doesn't cover a task that was preempted in the trampoline
just before the enter helper. That task holds no lock yet, and it calls
the prog after it was freed:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x3a5/0x3f0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000055040 by task candidate/110
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 110 Comm: candidate Not tainted 7.3.0-rc2-00014-g15071f2a1263-dirty #2 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x3a5/0x3f0
bpf_trampoline_6442509193+0x37/0xf1
__x64_sys_futex+0x9/0x410
do_syscall_64+0xb0/0x530
...
Wait for an RCU tasks grace period before the existing one when freeing
a prog that was linked to a trampoline. An RCU tasks grace period only
ends once the tasks that were preempted have run again, and
bpf_tramp_image_put() already relies on it to free the image. It doesn't
wait for tasks that sleep in the trampoline, the next commit takes care
of those.
Only progs that were linked to a trampoline can be called this way, so
bpf_trampoline_add_prog() marks them and other progs are still freed as
before. |
