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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-62334 | 1 Openvm-org | 1 Openvm | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify` constructs raw proof calldata from user-controlled `proofData`, performs a `staticcall` to `address(this)`, and treats a successful call as proof acceptance. If the first four proof bytes match another external selector exposed by the wrapper, dispatch can invoke a successful non-verifier function instead of the generated Halo2 fallback verifier. Applications using the generated Solidity wrapper can consequently accept arbitrary app commitments and public values without checking the proof suffix, accumulator, app commitments or public values. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62335 | 1 Openvm-org | 1 Openvm | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify` accepts `appExeCommit` and `appVmCommit` as `bytes32` values without checking that either is less than the `BN254` scalar field modulus. Although public-value and proof-data lengths are checked, callers can provide non-canonical 256-bit encodings greater than or equal to that modulus at the Solidity wrapper boundary. Applications relying on the wrapper can therefore accept non-canonical app executable and app VM commitments, creating ambiguity between the supplied byte-level values and the field elements used by the verifier. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62333 | 1 Openvm-org | 1 Openvm | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `MemoryMerkleAir` does not forbid Merkle expansion rows at `parent_height` = 0 or below while `expand_direction` != 0. A malicious prover can fabricate a subtree below a memory leaf and swap digests inside that subtree to change the committed memory root without a corresponding memory operation. The fraudulent rows still balance against the Merkle and compression buses and require no memory-bus operation for the changed leaf. Because the memory Merkle root binds VM memory state across continuation segment boundaries, this affects the soundness of OpenVM proofs using persistent memory. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46669 | 2 Openvm, Openvm-org | 2 Openvm, Openvm | 2026-06-12 | 7.5 High |
| OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Prior to version 1.6.0, the openvm-pairing guest library's try_honest_pairing_check function invokes Theorem 3 of https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/640.pdf but does not check that the scaling factor s is in a proper subfield of Fp12. This allows incorrect results to the pairing check. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.0. | ||||
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