vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload
vhost_vsock_alloc_skb() sizes the skb from iov_length(), the total guest
descriptor length. virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() instead adds hdr->len to
rx_bytes and buf_used, and budgets each queued skb as SKB_TRUESIZE(0). The
guest controls the descriptor length and hdr->len independently.
A guest can therefore provide a 64 KiB descriptor while declaring a zero
payload. The descriptor-sized skb remains queued, rx_bytes and buf_used
remain unchanged, and only the fixed queue-entry budget limits retention.
This is not a lifetime leak: the skb is freed when dequeued or at socket
teardown. Repeating this across connections can nevertheless exhaust host
memory. On Linux v7.2, 455 such descriptors retained 30,255,680 bytes for
a 262,144-byte receive buffer; a full-payload control retained 265,984
bytes.
Vhost previously read hdr->len and allocated pkt->buf from that value. The
conversion from virtio_vsock_pkt to sk_buff instead allocated receive skbs
from the descriptor length, introducing the allocation-accounting mismatch.
Copy the header into a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating
the skb. Size the allocation as sizeof(hdr) + payload_len so descriptor
capacity no longer determines queued memory. Check payload_len against
len - sizeof(hdr) to avoid addition overflow on 32-bit hosts.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
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Fri, 20 Nov 2026 12:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-770 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Linux linux
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| Vendors & Products |
Linux linux
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Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload vhost_vsock_alloc_skb() sizes the skb from iov_length(), the total guest descriptor length. virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() instead adds hdr->len to rx_bytes and buf_used, and budgets each queued skb as SKB_TRUESIZE(0). The guest controls the descriptor length and hdr->len independently. A guest can therefore provide a 64 KiB descriptor while declaring a zero payload. The descriptor-sized skb remains queued, rx_bytes and buf_used remain unchanged, and only the fixed queue-entry budget limits retention. This is not a lifetime leak: the skb is freed when dequeued or at socket teardown. Repeating this across connections can nevertheless exhaust host memory. On Linux v7.2, 455 such descriptors retained 30,255,680 bytes for a 262,144-byte receive buffer; a full-payload control retained 265,984 bytes. Vhost previously read hdr->len and allocated pkt->buf from that value. The conversion from virtio_vsock_pkt to sk_buff instead allocated receive skbs from the descriptor length, introducing the allocation-accounting mismatch. Copy the header into a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating the skb. Size the allocation as sizeof(hdr) + payload_len so descriptor capacity no longer determines queued memory. Check payload_len against len - sizeof(hdr) to avoid addition overflow on 32-bit hosts. | |
| Title | vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-20T05:49:52.334Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.426Z
Link: CVE-2026-99635
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-20T06:17:56.710
Modified: 2026-11-20T06:17:56.710
Link: CVE-2026-99635
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-20T11:30:16Z